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41 
Promoting Executive Accountability Through 
Qui Tam Legislation 
Randy Beck* 
The United States government has experienced a profound 
rebalancing of power over the past century as authority has 
shifted from the legislative branch to the executive branch.1 In 
domestic affairs, much federal law now comes from agencies 
operating under broad statutory mandates, and the tasks of 
weighing conflicting interests, devising specific regulatory 
standards, and setting enforcement priorities often fall to the 
executive.2 In the international sphere, there has been a rapid 
expansion in the number of agreements negotiated unilaterally 
by the executive branch, without submission to the Senate for 
ratification as treaties.3 With respect to military affairs, 
presidents have become increasingly comfortable with unilateral 
decisions to initiate combat and have sometimes side-stepped 
even the post-hoc congressional review process contemplated by 
the War Powers Resolution.4 
 
 *  Justice Thomas O. Marshall Chair of Constitutional Law, University of Georgia 
School of Law. The research for this essay was conducted while the author was a Garwood 
Visiting Fellow in the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions at 
Princeton University. I would like to express my appreciation to Tom Campbell for his 
comments on a draft of this essay. 
 1 Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of 
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 444–45 (2012) (“The power of the modern presidency has 
been enhanced by the gradual accumulation over time of an extensive array of legislative 
delegations of power. The complexities of the modern economy and administrative state, 
along with the heightened role of the United States in foreign affairs, have necessitated 
broad delegations of authority to the executive branch.”). 
 2 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L. 
REV. 953, 961–62 (2016) (delegations of authority by Congress have increased the power 
of the executive branch, particularly in light of legislative gridlock); PHILIP HAMBURGER, 
IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 111–28 (2014) (detailing numerous mechanisms 
through which executive branch agencies exercise legislative functions). 
 3 See Treaties, UNITED STATES SENATE https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/ 
history/common/briefing/Treaties.htm#3 (last visited May 10, 2017) [http://perma.cc/876P-
NYLL]; Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International 
Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1258–60 (2008) (375 treaties 
entered into by the U.S. from 1980–2000, compared to 2744 congressionally authorized 
executive agreements). 
 4 Douglas Kriner, Accountability Without Deliberation? Separation of Powers in 
Times of War, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1284 (2015) (“Since Truman, all presidents have 
asserted the office’s unilateral authority to order American military forces abroad, absent 
explicit congressional authorization, to pursue a wide range of policy goals.”); see also Eric 
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The increasing power of the executive branch underscores 
the importance of effective mechanisms to enforce legal 
constraints on executive conduct. The Constitution imposes on 
the president the duty to “take [c]are that the laws be faithfully 
executed,”5 and affords him the ability to respond to misconduct 
by his subordinates.6 But relying on the executive branch to 
police its own members will often prove inadequate due to 
unavoidable conflicts of interest and the difficulty of managing a 
vast bureaucracy. Congress can conduct occasional oversight 
hearings to investigate the legality of executive actions, but 
cannot directly respond to executive misconduct except through 
cumbersome processes like lawmaking or impeachment.7 That 
leaves the option of judicial enforcement of the law in suits by 
persons outside the executive branch. However, this mechanism 
can be stymied through application of Article III standing 
principles and other justiciability rules like the political question 
doctrine.8 In short, there may be many instances in which 
potentially illegal executive conduct goes unaddressed due to 
limitations of the standard options for ensuring executive branch 
legal compliance. 
In a forthcoming article, I review the history of a now 
largely-abandoned method for enforcing the law against 
government officials.9 From the fourteenth-century through the 
establishment of the United States government, it was very 
common for Anglo-American legislatures to regulate government 
officials through qui tam legislation. A qui tam statute allowed 
any member of the community to collect a fine for violation of a 
legal duty, and keep part of the proceeds, even if the litigant did 
 
A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Institutional Flip-Flops, 94 TEX. L. REV. 485, 497–98 
(2016) (noting partisan invocation of constitutional and War Powers Act restrictions in 
response to unilateral executive military interventions in Grenada, Panama, Serbia and 
Libya); Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 440–47 (explaining reasons it can be easier 
for the executive branch to act than the legislative branch). 
 5 U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cl. 1. 
 6 See Jurisdiction of Integrity Comm. When Inspector Gen. Leaves Office After 
Referral of Allegations, 2006 WL 5779980, at 3–4 (O.L.C. Sept. 5, 2006). 
 7 Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951–59 (1983) 
(Congress must comply with bicameralism and presentment requirements when acting to 
change legal rights, duties or relations of persons outside the legislative branch); U.S. 
CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3 (impeachment procedures), § 7 (procedures for passage of legislation). 
 8 See Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575–78 (1992) (applying standing 
doctrine to reject case against executive branch official); Stephen I. Vladeck, War and 
Justiciability, 49 SUFFOLK L. REV. 47, 47–48 (2016) (courts avoided ruling on the merits of 
Vietnam War cases in various ways including standing and political question grounds). 
 9 Randy Beck, Qui Tam Litigation Against Government Officials: Constitutional 
Implications of a Neglected History, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) 
[hereinafter Beck, Qui Tam Litigation Against Government Officials]. 
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not have a particularized injury as required by modern rules 
of standing.10 
This essay will consider the possibility of selectively reviving 
the tradition of qui tam legislation to enforce particular legal 
duties of executive branch officials. By overcoming Article III 
standing concerns, qui tam legislation has the capacity to fill 
gaps left by more common methods of enforcing the law. At the 
same time, introducing a profit motive into law enforcement 
carries risks that legislators should take into account. Part I will 
briefly describe the history of qui tam regulation of government 
officials in England, the early American states and the first two 
Congresses, and discuss the Supreme Court’s conclusion that qui 
tam litigation satisfies Article III standing requirements.11 
Part II will consider hypothetical qui tam legislation to enforce 
executive branch legal duties in three areas: (1) expending funds 
without a supporting congressional appropriation, or refusing to 
spend funds as directed by statute; (2) pursuing military action 
in violation of the War Powers Resolution; and (3) using 
private email systems for public business.12 Part III briefly 
considers downsides of reviving qui tam legislation to regulate 
executive officials.13 
I. QUI TAM REGULATION OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 
The fourteenth-century English Parliament faced significant 
challenges in providing for enforcement of laws governing a large 
country with a dispersed population.14 Some legislation was less 
problematic because it was designed to benefit private citizens 
individually. Violation of this kind of statute could be addressed 
through litigation pursued by the victim of illegal conduct.15 The 
more difficult problem arose when a law protected interests of 
the entire community or of the central government, rather than 
individual citizens. Today, government officials typically enforce 
such laws. In the fourteenth-century, however, there were far 
fewer government officials, and those at the local level might not 
 
 10 Id. at 3; see also Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771–78 
(2000) (finding qui tam plaintiff satisfied Article III standing requirements, even though 
suing based on injury to the United States). 
 11 See infra notes 14–34 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 35–73 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 74–81 and accompanying text. 
 14 See Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam 
Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 567 (2000) [hereinafter Beck, English Eradication]. 
 15 See, e.g., Statute of Labourers, 23 Edw. 3, ch. 1 (1349) (cause of action for party 
“damnified” by food merchant charging excessive prices, but also allowing qui tam 
enforcement as a backup). 
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vigorously enforce laws designed to advance goals of the 
central government.16 
Parliament developed the qui tam statute to prevent under-
enforcement of penal statutes, which could deprive laws of their 
deterrent effect.17 The typical qui tam statute imposed a legal 
obligation, specified a forfeiture for violation, and provided that 
any person could sue to collect the penalty, with the informer 
entitled to keep a percentage (usually half) if successful.18 The 
statutory authorization for anyone to sue, and the bounty offered 
to the successful informer, effectively deputized any member of 
the community to enforce the law, vastly expanding available law 
enforcement resources.19 
Most English qui tam statutes regulated private conduct, 
often commercial in nature.20 Early on, however, Parliament also 
deployed qui tam statutes to enforce specified duties of 
government officials. Initially, such qui tam provisions were used 
as a supplement to regulation of private commercial conduct, 
promoting integrity and diligence among regulatory officials. For 
instance, fourteenth-century statutes permitted qui tam actions 
against officials who traded in regulated commodities or who 
were less than diligent in enforcing regulatory requirements.21 
Over time, though, Parliament expanded the practice to take in 
an increasing array of officials performing a growing list of 
functions, e.g., purveyors acquiring goods for the royal household, 
ecclesiastical judges exceeding the limits on their jurisdiction, 
officials responsible for enforcing religious uniformity laws, 
revenue officers handling tax receipts, and individuals serving in 
Parliament despite a statutory disqualification.22 
Regulation of government officials through qui tam 
legislation was widely practiced in the American colonies and 
early states. Qui tam monitoring was used to promote statutory 
compliance by an enormous variety of state officials, particularly 
those performing decentralized functions such as road 
construction and maintenance, judicial administration, and 
 
 16 Beck, English Eradication, supra note 14, at 567. 
 17 Id. at 568 (qui tam statute increased chances statutory forfeiture would be 
enforced). The qui tam label derives from a longer Latin phrase that can be translated 
“who pursues this action on our Lord the King’s behalf as well as his own.” Vt. Agency of 
Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n.1 (2000). 
 18 Beck, English Eradication, supra note 14, at 552–53 (describing characteristics of 
qui tam statutes). 
 19 Id. at 569. 
 20 Id. at 570–71. 
 21 See Beck, supra note 9, at 22–24. 
 22 See id. at 25–29. 
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regulation of commercial activities.23 It was common for early 
states to rely on qui tam oversight to ensure lawful conduct by 
officials performing functions critical to public confidence in 
government, such as conducting elections and collecting taxes.24 
The United States Constitution was ratified against the 
backdrop of over four and a half centuries in which Anglo-
American legislatures had often regulated government officials 
through qui tam legislation.25 It should come as no surprise, 
then, that the earliest Congresses extensively employed qui tam 
statutes to regulate both private parties and executive branch 
officials. Statutes enacted in the first two Congresses included 
qui tam provisions applicable to federal revenue officers, census 
workers, Treasury officials, postal workers, and those regulating 
trade with Native American tribes.26 Qui tam regulation of 
executive branch officials disappeared over time as the growing 
number of government employees reduced the need for qui 
tam oversight and the demand for professionalization of public 
service prompted movement away from profit-motivated law 
enforcement mechanisms.27 There can be no doubt though that 
supervising the legality of executive branch conduct through qui 
tam litigation was understood as a permissible legislative option 
when the Constitution took effect. 
The case for selective qui tam monitoring of the executive 
branch rests on the Supreme Court’s understanding of 
standing principles flowing from the Article III “case or 
controversy” requirement. The Court has articulated a familiar 
injury-causation-redressability test for evaluating a litigant’s 
standing to sue: “The plaintiff must have suffered or be 
imminently threatened with a concrete and particularized ‘injury 
in fact’ that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the 
defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial 
decision.”28 For a quarter century, the Supreme Court has 
said that the requirement of a “particularized” injury—i.e., one 
that affects the plaintiff in a manner distinct from the public 
at large—represents part of the “irreducible constitutional 
minimum” of standing.29 This particularized injury requirement 
is often applied to deny standing in cases against the executive 
 
 23 Id. at 29–42. 
 24 Id. at 45–49. 
 25 Id. at 63. 
 26 See id. at 50–62. 
 27 See generally NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY 
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940 (2013) (detailing the shift away from 
profit-incentivized enforcement of the laws).  
 28 Lexmark Int’l Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014). 
 29 Id. (quoting Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
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branch, with courts dismissing claims that present only 
“generalized grievances” about the legality of government conduct.30 
Notwithstanding the rule that standing requires a 
particularized injury, the Court has found that qui tam litigation 
satisfies Article III requirements. In Vermont Agency of Natural 
Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, the Court considered a 
False Claims Act case in which a qui tam “relator” (i.e., informer) 
alleged that a federal grant recipient submitted false claims to 
the Environmental Protection Agency in an effort to obtain 
excess grant funds.31 The Court recognized that the relator had 
no personal injury in fact; the only particularized injury was 
suffered by the government.32 The Court nevertheless found 
Article III standing on the theory that the statute’s qui tam 
provision acted as a partial assignment to the relator of the 
government’s claim.33 The Court’s finding of standing for 
informers was supported by the “long tradition of qui tam actions 
in England and the American Colonies,” a history “well nigh 
conclusive with respect to the question before us here: 
whether qui tam actions were ‘cases and controversies of the sort 
traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial 
process.’”34 Since qui tam litigation allows the informer to 
challenge the legality of conduct that inflicts no particularized 
harm on the litigant, it creates the possibility of enhancing the 
legal accountability of executive officials in situations where 
private suits might easily be dismissed as generalized grievances. 
II. POSSIBLE MODERN APPLICATIONS OF QUI TAM LEGISLATION TO 
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
Qui tam legislation offers a potentially appealing mechanism 
for promoting legal compliance by executive branch officers 
because it allows judicial consideration of legal challenges that 
might otherwise fail for lack of standing. Let’s consider 
three types of legal duties that might be enforceable through qui 
tam monitoring. 
A. Reinforcing the Congressional Power of the Purse 
The Constitution vests in Congress broad control over the 
use of public money. Congress has the affirmative power “to pay 
the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general 
 
 30 See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571–78. 
 31 Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 770 (2000). 
 32 See id. at 772–73. 
 33 Id. at 774. 
 34 Id. at 766–77 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 
102 (1998)). 
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Welfare of the United States.”35 This power is reinforced by a 
negative prohibition: “No money shall be drawn from the 
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by law.”36 
Administrations of both major political parties have sometimes 
sought to circumvent the congressional power of the purse. The 
Nixon Administration famously asserted an authority to 
“impound” public funds, refusing to spend money on grounds 
unrelated to the congressional spending program in question.37 
The Obama Administration, on the other hand, was found to 
have violated the Constitution by sending money to insurance 
companies under the Affordable Care Act without a supporting 
congressional appropriation.38 
Standing doctrine tends to foreclose many lawsuits 
challenging the use of public money.39 In Frothingham v. Mellon, 
the Supreme Court determined that taxpayer status did not give 
an individual standing to challenge the constitutionality of a 
federal expenditure.40 An individual’s interest in money in the 
U.S. Treasury “is shared with millions of others, is comparatively 
minute and indeterminable, and the effect upon future taxation, 
of any payment out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating and 
uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the 
preventive powers of a court of equity.”41 This bar to taxpayer 
standing has long been understood as one application of the 
generalized grievance principle.42 Other case law has strictly 
limited lawsuits by individual members of Congress seeking to 
protect legislative powers.43 The recent case challenging 
Affordable Care Act payments to insurers satisfied standing 
concerns only because an entire house of Congress decided to file 
suit, something that would be impossible in many cases.44 
 
 35 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 36 Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
 37 See Train v. City of N.Y., 420 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1975) (finding the statute did not 
permit Environmental Protection Agency to allocate less funds for municipal sewage and 
treatment facilities than Congress authorized for appropriation); Adam Rozenzweig, 
The Article III Fiscal Power, 29 CONST. COMM. 127, 138–39 (2014) (discussing 
impoundment controversy). 
 38 See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 174–75 
(D.D.C. 2016). 
 39 See, e.g., Brown v. Ruckelshaus, 364 F. Supp. 258, 265 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (plaintiff 
lacked standing to challenge Environmental Protection Agency’s withholding of funds). 
 40 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).  
 41 Id. at 487. 
 42 See Turner v. City & Cty. of S.F., 617 Fed. Appx. 674, 677 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(claim asserted as taxpayer could not be pursued in federal court because only raised 
generalized grievance). 
 43 See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 830 (1997) (holding individual members of 
Congress lacked standing to challenge Line Item Veto Act). 
 44 U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 80–81 
(D.D.C. 2015). 
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There is precedent for using qui tam legislation to monitor 
government officials in connection with fiscal matters, as in the 
English and American statutes that regulated tax collection 
efforts.45 Caswell v. Allen46 was an early American case against 
one of the county supervisors of Cayuga County, New York. The 
New York legislature had instructed the county to raise up to 
$800 in tax revenues to build a fireproof clerk’s office near an 
anticipated new courthouse.47 The defendant joined the majority 
that voted down a proposal to comply with the legislative 
directive. A qui tam informer then sued the defendant under a 
statute imposing a $250 forfeiture on any county supervisor who 
neglected or refused to follow a law directing the county to levy 
funds for public buildings.48 The issue on appeal was whether the 
legislation concerning funds for a clerk’s office was mandatory or 
discretionary. The appellate court concluded that the legislation 
imposed a mandatory duty to raise revenue for a clerk’s office 
and therefore granted a new trial against the defendant.49 
A modern qui tam statute could be used to reinforce 
Congress’ power of the purse. The statute could impose a 
forfeiture on any executive official who refused to spend funds 
where a statute made the expenditure mandatory, or who 
authorized an expenditure that was not supported by a 
congressional appropriation. The qui tam provision would 
overcome Article III objections and eliminate the barrier to 
adjudication created by the rule against taxpayer standing. 
B. Preserving the Congressional Role in Military Affairs 
The constitutional allocation to Congress of the power to 
“declare war” has proved ineffective in ensuring congressional 
control over the use of military force. Our political and legal 
institutions early on accepted the lawfulness of military 
engagements that involved no such declaration.50 In the 
aftermath of the Vietnam War, Congress sought to reinvigorate 
the legislative role in military decision-making by adopting the 
War Powers Resolution (“WPR”). The provisions are complex, but 
the key points can be outlined succinctly. The president must 
 
 45 See supra notes 22, 24 and 26 and accompanying text. 
 46 7 Johns. 63 (N.Y. 1810). 
 47 Id. at 63. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 68–69. 
 50 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War 
on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2059–60 (2005) (“One reason is historical practice. 
Starting with early conflicts against Indian tribes and the Quasi-War with France at the 
end of the 1700s, the United States has been involved in hundreds of military 
conflicts that have not involved declarations of war.”). 
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consult with Congress whenever possible before introducing 
military forces into actual or imminent “hostilities,”51 and must 
report such deployments to Congress.52 As a general rule, the 
resolution instructs the president to terminate the deployment of 
troops unless Congress within sixty days declares war or adopts 
“specific authorization” for the use of force.53 Authorization may 
not be inferred from a provision of an appropriation statute 
unless it “specifically authorizes the introduction of United 
States Armed Forces into hostilities” and states that it is 
intended to satisfy the WPR authorization requirement.54 
Many observers argue that certain recent military operations 
have violated the letter or spirit of the WPR. President Clinton 
continued U.S. participation in the NATO bombing of Kosovo 
beyond the sixty day limit of the WPR based on the theory that 
Congress authorized the action through an appropriation 
provision, even though the statute rejects authorization by that 
means.55 President Obama claimed that extended participation 
in the NATO operation in Libya was not subject to the WPR 
because our drone and bombing attacks did not amount 
to “hostilities.”56 
Qui tam legislation was used historically to regulate militia 
service, enforcing duties such as showing up for training 
exercises with the necessary equipment.57 Could qui tam 
legislation potentially help Congress in the higher profile context 
of enforcing the WPR? Imagine a law imposing qui tam 
forfeitures on executive branch officials for acts such as 
(1) introducing troops into hostilities (perhaps accompanied by 
further definition of the term) without consulting with Congress 
in a situation where such consultation was possible, (2) failing to 
report to Congress within a specified time period after troops 
have been introduced into hostilities, or (3) continuing 
 
 51 50 U.S.C. § 1542. 
 52 Id. § 1543(a). 
 53 Id. § 1544(b). 
 54 Id. § 1547(a)(1). 
 55 See Jason Reed Struble & Richard A.C. Alton, The Legacy of Operation Allied 
Force: A Reflection on Its Legality Under United States and International Law, 20 MICH. 
ST. INT’L L. REV. 293, 310–13 (2012). But see Abraham D. Sofaer, The War Powers 
Resolution and Kosovo, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 71, 76–77 (2000) (arguing WPR provision 
preventing appropriations from serving as approval of a military operation is 
legally ineffective). 
 56 Jack Goldsmith & Matthew Waxman, Obama, Not Bush, Is the Master 
of Unilateral War, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 14, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/ 
article/119827/obamas-war-powers-legacy-he-must-seek-congressional-authorization 
[http://perma.cc/R34Z-8NPC] (stating that Obama administration construction of War 
Powers Resolution in connection with Libya operations was unconvincing). 
 57 See Beck, supra note 9, at 43. 
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participation in hostilities for more than 60 days without 
congressional authorization in the required form. 
A qui tam provision could remove the Article III standing 
barrier that courts have invoked to avoid adjudication of claims 
under the WPR.58 Cases seeking to enforce the resolution could 
nevertheless face other barriers to justiciability, especially the 
political question doctrine.59 The application of the political 
question doctrine depends on a variety of factors,60 but the force 
of some factors could be minimized by careful drafting. For 
instance, if Congress specified objective conditions that would 
trigger legal duties under the WPR and made clear that the 
duties are mandatory rather than discretionary, a court would be 
less likely to find a lack of “judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards” for resolving the case or the need for “an 
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion.”61 Dismissal on political question grounds would be 
more likely if the legal question arguably turned on the exercise 
of military or foreign affairs expertise. For instance, a court 
might find a political question if the executive branch was 
offering an intelligence-based analysis of the historical 
relationship between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State to argue 
that operations against the Islamic State come within the scope 
of the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force against Al 
Qaeda.62 On the other hand, if the sole issue was whether 
Congress had authorized a military action and (as in Kosovo) 
the only arguable authorization was an appropriations bill, 
the questions presented to the court would seem more legal 
in nature.  
While a qui tam provision might help get a WPR case into 
court, it is an open question whether one should view that as a 
desirable outcome. Some people would consider it unwise to place 
 
 58 See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 20–26 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding members 
of Congress lacked standing to challenge Kosovo bombing as a violation of the War 
Powers Resolution). 
 59 See Vladeck, supra note 8, at 47–48 (noting that in cases challenging the Vietnam 
War, courts avoided decisions on the merits in “every way imaginable,” including political 
question doctrine). 
 60 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 61 Id. 
 62 See MATTHEW C. WEED, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, R43760, A NEW 
AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE: ISSUES AND 
CURRENT PROPOSALS (2017) (“During his Administration, President Obama stated that 
the Islamic State can be targeted under the 2001 AUMF because its predecessor 
organization, Al Qaeda in Iraq, communicated and coordinated with Al Qaeda; the Islamic 
State currently has ties with Al Qaeda fighters and operatives; the Islamic State employs 
tactics similar to Al Qaeda; and the Islamic State, with its intentions of creating a new 
Islamic caliphate, is the ‘true inheritor of Osama bin Laden’s legacy.’”). 
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the president under legally enforceable constraints—even the 
loose constraints of the WPR—in dealing with rapidly changing 
international threats. Moreover, those desiring a greater 
congressional voice in decisions about the use of military force 
might find that overcoming barriers to adjudication proved a 
Pyrrhic victory. A court could resolve a case on the merits by 
reading the WPR in a manner deferential to the executive.63 
C. Preserving Official Email Records 
So far, we have discussed use of qui tam legislation to allow 
adjudication of high-level legal conflicts central to the allocation 
of power between Congress and the president. Disputes over the 
congressional appropriations power or the president’s unilateral 
initiation of military action are important, but not frequent. 
Historically, qui tam legislation was more often used to monitor 
activities of lower level officials performing the mundane daily 
tasks of government. For instance, qui tam statutes were often 
used in past centuries to promote thorough and accurate record 
keeping by public officials. English law used qui tam remedies to 
regulate record keeping regarding sales of horses at fairs and 
markets.64 Early state laws deployed qui tam monitoring to 
ensure that records of a justice of the peace were preserved upon 
death or resignation.65 The first Congress adopted qui tam 
legislation to govern creation and retention of census records.66 
To round out our discussion of the potential use of qui tam 
legislation to promote executive branch accountability, it is worth 
considering a modern record-keeping question that has been 
much in the news. The 2016 presidential election was roiled by 
disclosures that the Democratic nominee had set up a private 
email system through which she sent and received official 
electronic correspondence in her role as Secretary of State.67 
Official inquiries confirmed that an earlier Republican Secretary 
of State had also conducted some government business through a 
private email account.68 Doing public business on a private email 
 
 63 Given longstanding questions about the constitutional status of the War Powers 
Resolution, the risk of an executive-leaning interpretation might be heightened by the 
canon of constitutional avoidance. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380–81 (2005) (“If 
one of [two plausible statutory constructions] would raise a multitude of constitutional 
problems, the other should prevail—whether or not those constitutional problems pertain 
to the particular litigant before the Court.”). 
 64 Beck, supra note 9, at 25. 
 65 Id. at 37–38. 
 66 Id. at 56–57. 
 67 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, ESP-16-03, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY: 
EVALUATION OF EMAIL RECORDS MANAGEMENT AND CYBERSECURITY REQUIREMENTS 23–25 
(2016) (discussing private email use by Secretary Clinton). 
 68 Id. at 21–22 (discussing private email use by Secretary Powell). 
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system can undermine laws designed to ensure preservation of 
records, promote transparency, and reduce cybersecurity risks.69 
Notwithstanding campaign criticism of the Democratic nominee’s 
email practices, at least six close advisors to President Trump 
have reportedly used private email accounts since the election to 
discuss White House matters.70 
A private litigant might have difficulty challenging an 
official’s practice of using a private email account for public 
business. Assuming a relevant cause of action could be identified, 
the plaintiff could be deemed to allege a generalized grievance 
widely shared by the public at large.71 One public interest 
organization did manage to secure disclosure of many of the 
Secretary of State’s emails using the Freedom of Information Act 
(“FOIA”), presumably establishing a particularized injury based 
on the rights created by a FOIA request.72 However, since FOIA 
applies to an agency, it may not guarantee accountability of 
individual federal employees, and a significant number of agency 
records are exempt from release under the statute.73 
So how might qui tam legislation address modern concerns 
about email preservation by government employees? Imagine a 
statute imposing a $1000 forfeiture for each email sent in the 
course of a government employee’s official duties using a private 
email account. Statutory definitions could be used to create 
greater certainty about when an email was subject to the statute. 
A safe harbor provision could protect a government employee 
from suit if an email sent from a private account was promptly 
archived among the government’s official email records. The 
legislation could be enforced by any qui tam informer with 
 
 69 See id. at 2–19 (record keeping, preservation and transparency requirements), 26–
34 (cybersecurity policies). Lisa Jackson, director of the Environmental Protection Agency 
in President Obama’s first term, raised comparable transparency and record-keeping 
concerns (though not necessarily cybersecurity risks) when she sent emails on a second 
government email account registered under the alias “Richard Windsor.” Julian Hattam, 
Former EPA Chief Under Fire for New Batch of ‘Richard Windsor’ Emails, THE HILL 
(May 1, 2013), http://thehill.com/regulation/energy-environment/297255-former-epa-chief-
under-fire-for-new-batch-of-richard-windsor-emails [http://perma.cc/7E5L-5FXN]; see also 
Jaime Dupree, Documents Show Ex-Attorney General Lynch Used “Elizabeth Carlisle” as 
Email Alias, ATLANTA JOURNAL CONST. (Aug. 7, 2017), http://jamiedupree.blog.ajc.com/ 
2017/08/07/documents-show-ex-attorney-general-lynch-used-elizabeth-carlisle-as-email-
alias/ [http://perma.cc/864J-T3RP]. 
 70 Matt Apuzzo & Maggie Haberman, At Least 6 White House Advisers Used Private 
Email Accounts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/us/ 
politics/private-email-trump-kushner-bannon.html. 
 71 See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–77 (1974) (lawsuit 
challenging failure to release list of CIA expenditures presented a generalized grievance). 
 72 See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Kerry, 844 F.3d 952, 953 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (case seeking 
to recover emails from former Secretary of State’s private email accounts not moot). 
 73 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c) (1976) (FOIA exemptions). 
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evidence of an email violating the prohibition, with a successful 
informer entitled to keep half (or perhaps all) of the recovery as 
a bounty. 
At this point, some readers may be thinking this sounds like 
an excellent way to ensure that executive branch employees 
comply with legal obligations flowing from their role as public 
servants. Other readers, however, may be getting nervous as 
they contemplate how the statute might work in practice. Would 
federal employees be distracted from their jobs by burdensome 
litigation? Would profit-motivated lawyers or informers develop a 
business of targeting careless federal employees? Would the 
statute be put to political use by interest groups or partisan 
warriors? Such concerns underscore some of the possible 
downsides of qui tam regulation and help explain why such 
statutes fell into disfavor in England and the United States. The 
next section discusses some of the problems with qui tam 
legislation and whether those problems might be ameliorated 
through legislative drafting. 
III. POSSIBLE DRAWBACKS TO QUI TAM REGULATION OF 
EXECUTIVE OFFICIALS 
England eliminated its remaining qui tam statutes in 1951.74 
I have argued elsewhere that recurring problems experienced in 
the history of qui tam enforcement flowed from a conflict of 
interest built into the design of the legislation. A qui tam statute 
deputizes private citizens to represent the interests of the public 
in enforcing the law, but simultaneously offers the informer a 
private financial interest in the outcome. When these public and 
private interests pull in different directions, informers may 
pursue private gain at the expense of the public good.75 
English informers sometimes negotiated secret settlements 
with those allegedly in violation of qui tam legislation, keeping 
payments that should have been shared with the government.76 
They sometimes pursued fraudulent or malicious claims.77 They 
brought suit in inconvenient locations, making it burdensome for 
defendants to litigate.78 They sought to enforce statutes in ways 
that undermined the public good.79 Legislative responses to such 
abuses were only partially successful.80 Professional informers, 
 
 74 Beck, English Eradication, supra note 14, at 548–49. 
 75 Id. at 549. 
 76 Id. at 580–81. 
 77 Id. at 581–83.  
 78 Id. at 583. 
 79 Id. at 583–85. 
 80 Id. at 574–75, 590. 
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who made a livelihood through qui tam litigation, came to 
be despised by the public and were sometimes beaten by 
angry mobs.81 
It is easy to imagine a modern informer’s conflict of interest 
producing analogous problems to those experienced in English 
history. If a statute permitted qui tam litigation against 
executive branch employees for failing to perform some legal 
duty, lawyers might be tempted to build a practice around suing 
agents of the federal government. The public interest could be 
undermined by distracting employees from their duties, or by 
applying the statute to the limits of its language. If there was a 
qui tam statute penalizing government use of private email, for 
instance, and a federal employee used a private email system to 
deal with an unanticipated emergency, a public prosecutor would 
have discretion to decline to bring a case, reasoning that the 
public interest did not warrant prosecution. The bounty provision 
of a qui tam statute, however, tends to make profit maximization 
the goal of law enforcement. Qui tam legislation can effectively 
eliminate the disinterested exercise of prosecutorial discretion for 
the benefit of the public. 
Such problems could potentially be ameliorated in the 
drafting process. Perhaps Congress could make qui tam bounties 
very low, so that such litigation would only be pursued by public 
interest firms motivated by considerations other than profit. 
Perhaps the legislation could place a cap on the amount a person 
could earn under a qui tam statute, preventing individuals from 
becoming professional informers. There could be a mechanism for 
the Department of Justice to dismiss qui tam cases it considered 
abusive or contrary to the public interest. At the very least, 
however, the problems that led England to eliminate qui tam 
legislation midway through the last century suggest that 
Congress should exercise great caution, carefully weighing costs 
and benefits, before deploying this particular tool for promoting 
executive branch accountability. 
 
 
 81 Id. at 576–78. 
